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Abstract
Institutional research should be ready to move to the next stage, a stage that is, as argued
by this paper, characterized by a more comprehensive approach integrating economics, politics,
and social culture. The theoretical foundation for such a move exists, as the interconnection
between political institutions and economic institutions has been addressed by North, Fukuyama,
and Acemoglu, and the influences of cultural heritage on institutional choices have further been
mentioned by North and Huntington. Another shift in institutional research proposed by this
paper is a change from general to specific solutions because the institutional characteristics
become individualized after considering the impacts of culture heritage.
This paper presents the correlations between political and economic institutions and the
unique characteristics of political orders taking different developmental paths using a data
analysis based on the World Governance Index (WGI) and other development indicators. The
paper also discusses the influences of cultural heritage on institution’s choice of transformation
path and proposes a institutional research framework.
Keywords: Institutional Economics, Political Economy, Comparative Economic System,
Comparative Political System, World Governance Index (WGI)
JEL: O43, P26, P51
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21. Introduction
Institutional research has achieved outstanding results in the last few decades, and with
the support of the empirical works such as Acemoglu et al. (2002), Acemoglu et al. (2014),
Henisz (2000), Rodrik et al. (2002), Tavares and Warcziarg (2001), Varsakelis (2006), the
conclusion that institutions matter for economic and social development has been well accepted
among academicians and policy makers. However most of these studies, based on samples of up
to a hundred countries, conclude with general statements that apply to all countries, and the
individual characteristics of institutional groupings for different countries have not been further
explored. Moreover, most studies concentrate on the impacts of political and economic
institutions on income levels and GDP per capita growth rates and the interconnections between
political and economic institutions are not sufficiently addressed theoretically or empirically.
This paper contributes to the institutional research literature in two prospects. First, this
paper takes a political economy approach to analyses institutions and recognizes the different
views on development between the political economy approach and the pure economics approach.
The coherence between political and economic institutions is examined and the paper argues that
the development of political institutions has its own means. The World Governance Index (WGI),
developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, includes six divisions of measurements and has
been widely used as a proxy of political institutions. In this paper, WGI is taken as a performance
measurement of political order development. Following Fukuyama’s political order theory, WGI
is restructured into 3 parts: The State, Rule Of Law, and Accountable Government. The
characteristics of the political order for countries grouped by different average income levels are
then presented. Second, this paper, by taking an individualized analysis approach, discusses the
unique institutional characteristics of the three groups of countries, include total development
group, CEE group, fast development group. Furthermore, the paper explains the role of
knowledge and cultural heritage in the transformation of institutions. Finally the paper presents a
purposed instructional research frame
WGI covers six dimensions of governance quality:
Ⅰ Voice and accountability (VA) – captures perceptions of the extent to which
the citizens of a country are able to participate in selecting their government, in
addition to freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of the
media.
Ⅱ Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (PV) – captures
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized
or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including
politically motivated violence and terrorism.
Ⅲ Government effectiveness (GE) – captures perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of civil services, and the degree of the government’s
independence from political pressures and includes the
quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the
government's commitment to such policies.
Ⅳ Regulatory quality (RQ) – captures perceptions of the government’s ability to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and
promote private sector development.
Ⅴ Rule of law (RL) – captures perceptions of the extent to which agents
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, with particular
attention to the quality of contract enforcement and property rights, the
quality of the police and the courts, and the likelihood of crime and
violence.
Ⅵ Control of corruption (CC) – captures perceptions of the extent to
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and
grand forms of corruption, and the degree to which government functions are
controlled by state elites and private interests.
3All six indicators are based on a -2.5 to 2.5 scale, in which 2.5 denotes the strongest
governance and -2.5 denotes the weakest.
WGI data are available from 1996 to 2013, and thus the other economic and social
indicators are also selected for this eighteen-year time period. Countries are classified by World
Bank Income Category. Economic data are from the World Bank database; other measurements
include the Human Development Index published by the United Nations, The Global Innovation
Index published by Cornell University, and The Global Competition Index published by the
World Economic Forum.
This paper includes six sections in total. The next section presents the political economy
approach to institutional analysis. Section three demonstrates the special characteristics of
political institutions for the four groups of countries. Section four discusses the role of knowledge
and cultural heritage in the evolution of institutions. An institutional research framework is
presented in section 5 along with the policy implications of this study. Finally, the paper is
concluded in section six
2. The Political Economy Approach to Institutional Analysis
The political economy approach takes a different view to development, emphasizes the
interconnections between economic and political institutions and recognizes the independent
purpose behind the development of political institutions. Moreover, because political institutions
are endogenous, political economy approach pay more attention on the individual characteristics
of social institutions and its caused and consequences
2.1 View on development
In political economy theory, development is considered in a much broader sense than
from a purely economic view. Sen views development as the process of expanding real freedoms.
He believes that the goal and purpose of development is not the simple process of wealth
accumulation but instead should capture the full development of a human being: “Greater
freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves and also to influence the world, and
these matters are central to the process of development. ..... The success of a society is to be
evaluated, in this view, primarily by the substantive freedoms that the members of that society
enjoy” (Sen, 1999). Freedom is viewed as both (1) the primary end and (2) the principal means
of development. Any types of underdevelopment, such as continuous famines, malnutrition,
insufficient health care, inequality, systematically denied political liberty or basic human rights,
and disadvantaged people in developed countries are all forms of unfreedom (Sen, 1999).
Fukuyama also emphasized the idea of total development: “successful modernization
depends, then, on the parallel development of political institutions alongside economic growth,
social change, and ideas... Development is not only about economics. Political institutions
develop, as do social ones. Sometimes political and social developments are closely related to
economic change, but at other times they happen independently.” (Fukuyama, 2012)
Pure economic approach take GDP per capita as the measurement for development and
the weakness of this measurement has been raised in the economic research in recent years
because this measurement does not provide any information on how the wealth is generated,
distributed, and the cost of the wealth generation. To measure the total development of a society
a more comprehensive measurement is required. WGI, in this paper, is adopted to measure the
political development of a society.
Data charts in Appendix Fig-1 show that the positive relations between the income
level and WGI are existing in High Income Countries, although a few resources rich countries
are departure from the trend which could be because the high wealth of these countries are
mainly from the resources endowment rather that the good quality institutions. Although as
the group Lower Income Countries generally have lower WGI scores, but the relationship
between GDP per capita and WGI are not so clear in Up-Middle Income Countries and Low-
Middle Income Countries. For example the WGI score for Mauritius is 0.85, that is higher
than WGI scores of many High Income Countries, but its income level is only around the
4middle level in Up-Middle Income Countries. Lesotho and Mongolia, the members of Low
Middle Income Countries, have the similar WGI scores but the income level of Mongolia is
four times of Lesotho’s. This data analysis indicates that in most High Income Countries the
higher income level associates higher WGI scores, however, the quality of institution may not
be a good explaining for developing countries and the income gap between these countries
could be caused by other reasons.
Table 2-1 Statistics for WGI and GDP per Capita
High Income Up-Mid Income Low-Mid Income
Number of countries 56 50 49
GDP per capita 2013 Mean 36281 7014 1907
STD 23921 3302 1282
WGI 2013 Mean 1.0222 -0.2358 -0.604
STD 0.5346 0.5669 0.4474
2.2 Internal connections between political and economic institutions
The natural connections between political and economic institutions are well
addressed in the institutional and political economy theories: “Broadly speaking, political
rules in place lead to economic rules, though the causality runs both ways. That is, property
rights and hence individual contracts are specified and enforced by political decision-
making, but the structure of economic interests will also influence the political structure”
(North, 1990).
Acemoglu et al. (2005) presented a model that clearly demonstrates the
connections between economic and political institutions
political de jure economic economic
institutionst ⇒ political ⇒ institutionst performancet
powert ⇒ &
distribution of
distribution de facto political of resourcest+1
of resourcest ⇒ political ⇒ institutionst+1
powert
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) further classified institutions as inclusive or extractive
and stated that “Inclusive economic institutions are in turn supported by, and support, inclusive
political institutions… extractive economic institutions are synergistically linked to attractive
political institutions.”
Table 2-2 is a statistical summary of Political Right (PR), represented by VA in
WGI; and Economic Right (ER), represented by the part of Fraser’s Economic Freedom
Index (legal system & property rights and freedom to engage in international trade) for all
income levels.
Table 2-2 Statistics for Political Right (PR) and Economic Right (ER)
High Income Up-Mid Income Low-Mid Income
Number of countries 41 27 17
Average ER, 2013 Mean 7.6439 5.8816 5.6330
STD 0.6872 2.8869 1.6920
Average PR, 2013 Mean 1.0583 0.0387 -0.4035
STD 0.2562 0.7010 0.2202
5Fig-2 in the Appendix shows that political and economic right are positively related
for all income levels. However, the countries/economies listed in Table-2-2-A show a
significant departure from the trend, as they have higher ranks in Economic Right but lower
ranks in Political Right; by contrast, Argentina has much higher Political Right and very low
Economic Right. According to the political theories of AJR, Fukuyama, and Sen, broadly
distributed political right is the precondition of broadly distributed economic right, but these
countries do not satisfy such political logic. This abnormal phenomenon indicates that
inclusive economic institutions could be supplied by exclusive political institutions.
Acemoglu and Robinson acknowledged this possibility, but they also argued that this type of
institutional mismatch would not be sustainable (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). However,
the reality is that Hong Kong and Singapore have maintained half a century of stable
economic growth with such a mismatch, and China saw a similar result over 30 years.
Section 4 will discuss this finding from a cultural and heritage perspective. These special
cases further demonstrate that institutional characteristics vary across countries and that
general theories may be applicable for most cases, but not all.
Table 2-2-A: Higher Economic Right (ER) and lower Political Right (PR)
Countries Code Income Group ER ER ranks in the Group PR PR ranks in the Group
Oman OMN High 8.72 4 -1.00 40
Hong Kong HKG High 8.38 7 0.70 33
Singapore SGP High 8.31 8 0.06 38
Kuwait KWT High 7.65 21 -0.65 39
Jordan JOD Up-Middle 7.05 3 -0.82 21
China CHN Up-Middle 6.21 10 -1.58 26
(High Income is a 40-countries group, Upper-Middle Income is a 28-countries group)
2.3 The ends and means of the development of political institutions
Political institutions are not developed for the narrow purpose of delivering economic
institutions; they have their own purpose, which is an issue of political morality. Both Eastern
and Western civilizations have a long history of political moral beliefs, and these philosophies
have guided political evolution for thousands of years.
In the Aristotelian view, the state is a moral entity: it should aim at securing
the public preconditions to make possible a “good and decent” life for citizens. Hence, justice
ought to provide the foundation of any polity. The fundamental value of political philosophy is
the public interest or the commonweal. The public interest would be entirely realized if social
organization were such that each individual in a society is in a position to realize his specific
natural potential, i.e., to live a good and decent life (Bortis, 1997).
Political systems in Ancient China were fully based on morality, the only constraints
to the ruling power was moral conduct. "The first principle of government, in the view of
Confucius, is as the first principle of character—sincerity. Therefore, the prime instrument of
government is good example: the ruler must be an eminence of model behavior, from which,
prestige imitation, right conduct will pour down upon his people." (Durant, W.A. 1993)
Political moral philosophy continues to play an important role in modern political
theory. In his very influential work <<The Theory of Justices>>, Rawls points out that “justice
is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however
elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions
6no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust”
(Rawls, 1971).
Fukuyama defines the political order in three divisions: 1. The State; 2. The Rule Of
Law; 3. Accountable Government. WGI thus is redefined according to Fukuyama’s political
order:
WGI Fukuyama’s Political Order
RL Rule of law
VA Accountable Government (AccG)
Average of (PS, GE, REG, CC) State
Table 2-3 Statistics of Political Order, 2013
Fig-3 in the Appendix show the three parts political order are supported each other.
Rule of the law and democracy support the quality of government and the democracy and
rule of the law also support each other. In High Income Countries there are a few
countries/economies are out of the trends, include Singapore, Hong Kong, Macao, and those
resources rich countries. The positive relations are also much looser in the up-middle
income countries and low-middle income countries.
3. Characteristics of the Political and Economic Institutions for Four Unique
Groups
One of the major contributions made by D. North to institutional theory is the theory of
path dependence in institutional change: “Path dependence is the key to an analytical
understanding of long-run economic change. Path dependence comes from the increasing
returns mechanisms that reinforce the direction once on a given path. Alterations in the path
come from unanticipated consequences of choices, external effects, and sometimes forces
exogenous to the analytical framework. Reversal of paths (from stagnation to growth or vice
versa) may come from the above described sources of path alteration, but will typically occur
through changes in the polity.” (North, 1990)
Path dependence theory inspires us to argue that institutional characteristics and the
evolutionary process should be individualized to each nation, as each nation has its own past
experiences. A general description may cover some common features, but unique characteristics
must exist for a unique experience. This section discusses four groups of countries with unique
political and economic institutional characteristics.
3.1 The total development group
Fukuyama uses the term of "getting to Denmark” to refer to the goal of political order
development. "Denmark" in this context is a mythical place that is known to have good
political and economic institutions: it is stable, democratic, peaceful, prosperous, inclusive,
and has extremely low levels of political corruption (Fukuyama, 2012).
High Income Up-Mid Income Low-Mid Income
Number of countries 56 50 49
Rule of law Mean 1.02 -0.49 -0.75
STD 0.0737 0.8599 0.4862
AccG Mean 1.01 -0.10 -0.41
STD 0.2326 0.7010 0.7192
State Mean 1.01 -0.29 -0.59
STD 0.0560 0.6962 0.4286
7A group of twenty-one countries meet the attributes of “Denmark”. They are at the top
level for both wealth and the quality of institutions. Their ranks in terms of wealth (GDP per
capita), institutional quality (WGI), and Human Development (HDI) are all in the top 30 in the
total sample of 161 countries. Two countries in this group are not in the top 30 for innovation, and
six countries are not in the top 30 for competition (see Appendix Table -1).
Eighteen out of twenty-one countries in this group have a Western cultural background.
There are many great works that describe the evolutionary process of Western Europe. In his
influential book <<The Origin of Political Order>> Fukuyama describes in detail how belief in
the rule of law and individualism emerged from religion, and how and why nation states were
established much later in Europe than in China. As Fukuyama points out, “Modern political
institutions appeared far earlier in history than did the Industrial Revolution and the modern
capitalist economy… The roots of Western social modernization were thus laid several centuries
before the rise either of the modern state or the capitalist market economy.” Fukuyama further
notes that the “early development of law in Europe was also very important in establishing limits
to state power. The very lateness of the European state-building project was the source of the
political liberty that Europeans would later enjoy.” (Fukuyama, 2012)
The journey of these countries is unique, and it is impossible to copy thousands of years
of cultural roots; therefore, what can the rest of the world learn from this successful experience?
The three Asian economies in this group provide a good “catch up” example. They do not possess
Western cultural roots; instead, they are culturally strongly influenced by Confucianism. However,
the WGI scores of Singapore and Hong Kong are even higher than the WGI score of US.
Originally, these focus institutions were not fully endogenous in these three Asian
economies; they were either adopted by the ruling elites or were forced upon these countries by
foreign nations. However, these institutions could be smoothly implemented in part due to the
inclusive nature of Confucianism. For thousands of years, Confucianism has co-existed and
benefited from mutual enrichment with many “foreign” philosophies. Moreover, the
philosophical concepts of natural law, human dignity, and justice equally exist in traditional
Asian values; they are merely institutionalized in different formats. Thus, an institutional set
such as that represented by WGI has no conflicts with Asian beliefs and values.
Nevertheless, the influence of tradition is still visible in the characteristics of political
order. Singapore and Hong Kong are ranked very high in rule of law and government capacity,
but are ranked very low in VA. For Japan, the six WGI divisions are about evenly ranked.
Macao, Korea, and Taiwan are not included in this total development group because their WGI
ranks are below the top 30 and there is no economic data in the World Bank database for
Taiwan. However, their political order has similar characteristics to the above three economies,
with the RL and government capacity being ranked higher than VA.
Table 3-1 Rank Scores of GDP per capita and WGI each divisions for East Asian
developed economies
Country Code
GDP
PC WGI VA RL PS GE REG CC
Macao.
SAR,
China MAC 4 56 105 49 49 37 21 76
Singapore SGP 10 11 81 11 6 2 1 4
Japan JPN 29 23 26 21 60 22 27 32
Hong
Kong
SAR,
China HKG 30 17 51 18 40 10 2 16
Korea Rep KOR 32 41 53 37 70 33 36 52
8Taiwan,
China TWN - 30 47 28 45 30 28 49
According to political theory, democracy and the rule of law provide the necessary
constraints on the ruling power. In the cases of Hong Kong and Singapore, the very high
government quality is mostly supported by one source of constraint: the rule of law. This
phenomena will explained from culture heritage prospect in next section
3.2 The CEE countries group
There are nine CEE countries in this group: Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland,
Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Latvia, Croatia, and Hungary. Eight of these nine joined the EU in
2004 (see Appendix Table -2).
These countries are a good example of development through the transfer of institutions.
Their major institutions were transferred during the later 1980s and early 1990s, which is outside
of the time frame of this study. However, the WGI data indicate that seven out of nine countries
are continuing to improve institutional quality and that all nine countries improved competitive
capacity over these eighteen years. The GDP per capita growth rate is much higher than that of
the first group, but the standard deviation (STD) of the growth rate is also high.
Kornai (2005) summarizes six characteristics of CEE transformation:
1. and 2. The changes followed the main direction of the development of Western
civilization: in the economic sphere, change was in the direction of a capitalist economic
system, and in the political sphere, change was in the direction of democracy.
3. There was a complete transformation, parallel in all spheres: in the economy, in the
political structure, in political ideology, in the legal system and in the stratification of society.
4. The transformation was non-violent.
5. The process of transformation took place under peaceful circumstances. It was not
preceded by war. The changes were not forced upon society as a result of foreign military
occupation.
6. The transformation took place with incredible speed, within a time frame of ten to
fifteen years.
Kornai observed that “the presence of all six characteristics together is unique in world
history” (Kornai, 2005). Such a perfect transaction must have occurred for unique reasons;
section 4 explains this transformation taking a cultural heritage point of view.
3.3 The fast growth group
This group is composed of countries ranked within the top 20 for GDP per capita
growth rates; all of them achieved over 5% annual growth for the eighteen-year period (see
Table -3 in Appendix).
Some countries in this group are “high income” countries, such as Macao, Estonia,
Lithuania, and Latvia; they are still ranked at the top for their growth rate. The rest of this
group are mainly developing Asian and CIS countries. The rapid growth of some countries
were combined with improvement in the WGI, for example, most CIS countries and the Asian
countries of Myanmar and Cambodia. However, other countries did not see this improvement
in WGI, such as China, Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Mongolia. The average GDP per capita growth
rate of China for this eighteen-year period is 8.78, with a STD of 1.9, and the STDs of the
growth rate for Lao PDR and Vietnam are even lower than that of China. The WGI of China,
Vietnam, and Lao PDR were all worsened over the eighteen years.
Table 3-3-A Percentage change in WGI for each division 1996-2013
Countries Code VA RL PS GE REG CC
CHINA CHN -21.82 -5.67 -227.91 88.21 -127.10 -41.02
INDIA IND 2.02 -138.19 -30.15 -132.31 -7.41 -39.09
9LAO PDR LAO -68.33 21.40 -71.72 -12.86 33.10 -90.27
VIETNAM VNM -24.20 -20.79 -45.36 35.92 -23.82 -23.69
MONGOLIA MNG -78.91 -875.97 -24.75 -37.51 -52.67 -271.27
How could such low volatility and high-speed growth were achieved over eighteen
years without the upgrading of institutions? There should be institutions not captured by the
WGI that explain this growth. These countries experience also demonstrates that the fast
economic growth could happened without the good political order condition, the economic
development and political development, although closed connected, but still have their own path
and cause.
4. The Role of Knowledge and Culture in Institutions Transformation
Kornai (2005) summarizes the different characteristics some major historical
transformations, three of them are related to this study:
Table 4-1 Characteristics of transformations --- from Kornai (2005)
Characteristics of transformation CEE region China: Transformation From the Middle Ages to Modernity, from
after Mao pre-capitalism to capitalism
1 Mainly towards development of the yes yes yes
economic system?
2 Mainly towards development of the yes No yes
political system?
3 Parallel in all spheres? yes No Yes (with time lags)
4 Without violence? yes yes No
5 Without foreign military occupation? yes yes No
6 Rapid? yes no No (very long period)
These six attributes state the facts, but do not provide the reasons for these
characteristics. Two more attributes should be added to this list: The Roles of Knowledge and
Cultural Heritage. These two attributes could be the drivers behind the above six facts.
4.1 Accumulated knowledge or borrowed knowledge
Prior to the period of industrialization, there was no model of modern society for Europe.
From the Great Charter in the 13th century to mass democracy in the 20th century, each step
towards broadly distributed political and economic rights was driven by new political and
economic forces that were seeking their interest and protecting their rights. The evolution of
institutions was the result of a long period of political and economic competition between and
within the nations. The modernization of Europe represented a journey of several hundreds of
years of experimentation and self-correction. The full set of institutions represented by WGI is an
accumulation of hundreds of years of institutional reforms.
Combined with this institutional evolution was consistent knowledge creation. The great
achievements of the natural sciences and social science built up the foundation for the
development of technology and institutions. Without Enlightenment and the philosophical works
of John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Mill, etc., it was unlikely that an inclusive political
and economic institution could have been established.
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Europe’s modernization was not peaceful because the institutions were not pre-designed;
they were the compromise results of all types of competition. Europe’s modernization was slow
because it was a process of constant exploring and learning.
The institutional changes for CEE and for the developed Asian countries/economies,
such as Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, are instead examples of adopting existing
knowledge. They do not represent Hayek’s spontaneous change; rather, they were changes driven
by the ruling elite or new political forces who accepted Western political ideology and
philosophy and led institutional change in a top-down format. Therefore, these transformations
could be completed in a short period of time.
4.2 Heritage values and norms
The successful and peaceful implementation of a “borrowed” institution depends on how
coherent the foreign institution is with the prevailing local value norms or the local informal
institutions. The transformation process for both developed Asian countries/economics and the
CEE were smooth and peaceful. Although the CEE countries experienced a different political
system in the 20th century, they still share deep cultural roots with Europe, such as Christianity
and German civil law. So “returning to Europe” was not only a process of institutional change,
but was also a process of culture and values “returning home”. This transfer was peaceful because
the political ideology and the social cultural values were coherent; and this transfer was fast
because these countries directly adopted already existing knowledge.
Influenced by the Confucian culture, many Asian countries/economics have a similar
political culture. First, they have a strong state. Fukuyama gives a very detailed explanation of
the political system of Ancient China. “Different from Europe where individualism and the rule
of law emerged much earlier than the modern state, China alone created a modern state in the
terms defined by Max Weber two thousand years ago. That is, China succeeded in developing a
centralized, uniform system of bureaucratic administration that was capable of governing a huge
population and territory when compared to Mediterranean Europe.” “The Chinese state was
centralized, bureaucratic, and enormously despotic. In China, the state was consolidated before
other social actors could institutionalize themselves” (Fukuyama, 2012).
The second factor to consider for Asian countries/economics is rule of law. As a
philosophical concept and an administrative tool, rule of law has been in place for thousands of
years. “Law is the authoritative principle of the people and is the basis of government; it is what
shapes the people. Trying to govern while eliminating the law is like a desire not to be hungry
while eliminating food, or a desire not to be cold while eliminating clothes, or a desire to go east
while one moves west. It is clear enough that there is no hope of realizing it.” ----- Book of
Emperor Shang,商君书, 16th -11th century B.C. (Coase and Wang, 2012).
Unlike rule of law in Europe, rule of law in Ancient China did not originate with
religion, but instead grew from the philosophy of natural law. The concepts of natural law and
the relations between natural law and human law were well addressed in the "Spring and
Autumn” philosophies, such as the works of Laozi, Mengzi, and the Huang Lao Philosophy.
Regarding an accountable government, Ancient China relied on a moral standard rather
than on law and democracy. Confucius believed that the country should be ruled by well-
educated self-disciplined elites. These elite rulers should use their power for the public interest
and not for themselves. If they abused their power, then the people would have the right to push
them out of their ruling position. Confucius had a full self-enlightenment system to train the
ruling elites. “The literati gentry class, “士”, had a unique social, political, and cultural status
that cannot be found in any other historical civilization. This literati class essentially ruled China
during much of history. The personality they should possess is wealth and fame never mean
much to him, poverty and obscurity never sway him, and imposing forces never awe him” (Coase
and Wang, 2012).
Two aspects of Ancient China’s political system and modern society have clear
differences. First, the legal system in Ancient China was an administrative tool and did not have
the political function of constraining power. The second difference is in the relationship between
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the ruler and the masses. From Ancient Greece to Medieval Italy, Europe has had a tradition of
self-governed cities or communities. In Ancient China, because the state was established very
early, it possessed an almost “holy” meaning in the political order. People in Ancient China left
public affairs in the hands of “benevolent” rulers rather than managing them themselves. They
expected their rulers to carry public duties for the public interest, as they were trained in this way.
Justice was available to the masses because they depose the crown using the power of natural law
if they found that their ruler abused his duty, as such behaviour was against the benevolent rule of
heaven. However, this type of justice was often realized through violence.
Confucianism dominated Ancient China’s political system for thousands of years
and influenced many Asian countries as recently as the last century, when Western ideology
entered Asia. Since Confucianism left the center stage of the political system, no new
philosophies have emerged in Asia, and most Asian countries have adopted various Western
philosophies during the process of modernization. With the inclusive nature of their
traditional philosophies and similar core values, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea,
and Taiwan successfully and peacefully implemented the “borrowed” institutions that are
represented by the WGI. However, the characteristics of political order in Ancient China—a
strong state, rule of law, and a weak civil society—are still visible in some Asian countries
and economies.
5. Academic and Policy Prospects
The analysis results of above sections clearly indicate that the economic institutional and
political institutions are closed integrated and both general and unique characteristics of
institutions are existing because the opportunity of open learning and the influence of the
culture heritage. This paper purpose a framework, as Fig5-1, for the future institutional research.
Fig. 5 Institutional Framework
The three part of “Current Institutions Set” are interconnected and together to form a
kind of “institutional equilibrium” which should balances the power of all economic and
political counterparts and should be well fitted with the current social norm and value. The
future research should provide the guide on what are the optimal combination of the economic
institutions, political institutions, and culture norm for the total social development, further
more, what is the functioning mechanism of integration of these three parts.
Economic Institutions
Political Institutions
Social value and Norm
New
Technology
New
knowledge
New economic
and political
forces
Culture
Heritage
12
This “institutional equilibrium” should has a dynamic nature and it is constantly
influenced by the external forces. There are four major external change forces:Culture heritage,
New Technology, New Knowledge, and New Economic and Political forces.
Culture heritage should be endogenous for a society, however, there are the cases in
history the institutions were changed by re-learning the culture heritage, such as Renaissance
and Enlightenment period of time. The “Reform and Opening” of China since 1980’s is not
only an opening to the outside of the world, is also the opening to China’s own culture heritage,
and this re-learning process largely influence the current institutions choices and the current
social norm.
Institutions are about the human cooperation and the change of technology greatly
changed the way of human cooperation. A good example is the internet technology changed
face to face cooperation to online cooperation. Such technology change must combined with the
institutions change. The current institutions determines how much and how fast of the change of
technology and the technology change will result the creation of new institutions.
New knowledge represents the opportunity of learning from others, the learning could be
the mean of directly adopting other’s institutions, such as the Asia and CEE cases mentioned in
the last section, or the leaning could bring the change of value and norm so that lead to the
demand for the new institutions. With the more broad range of information resources, such
learning become fast ever in the history and the social norm and value are also changed much fast
when it was assumed before.
The new economic or political power could be formed under the condition of current
institutional set or emerged with other external accidental factors. They represent the new
political an economic counterparts and their demand for the political and economic power will
break the current “institutional equilibrium”.
The policy prospect of this study includes the concept that modernization is the progress
of all spheres of a society, including the development of scientific knowledge and human art.
Partial progress or partial reform cannot be sustainable. Considering the differing historical
heritage, the optimal institutional set could be a specified package rather a general one. The most
effective help to those who need it is the supply of knowledge and education, as knowledge and
education are the foundation of the right belief set, and the right belief set is the foundation for the
right institutional set.
6. Conclusions
With its remarkable achievements over the last several decades, institutional research is
ready to move to a new stage. This new stage should be marked by the integration of economics,
politics and history into a single institutional frame and the movement from a general to an
individualized approach. The theoretical foundation for such a move is not new. Political
economy theories already recognize the interconnections between political and economic
institutions. Path dependence theory indicates that institutional characteristics should be
individual rather than general.
Data analysis demonstrates that both general and specific characteristics of economic
and political institutions exist for countries at different income levels. Institutional change
could be a Hayek type “spontaneous” change, such as Europe’s transformation process; it
could also be implemented by a ruling elite with existing knowledge, similar to the case of
developed Asian countries/economies; or by new political forces, such as the case of CEE and
CIS. The harmonization of these “borrowed” institutions with local values and norms is the
critical issue for the success of institutional transfer.
The successful examples of transformation with “borrowed institutions” are CEE and
developed Asia. These “borrowed institutions” are the fruit of European cultural tradition. For
CEE, the institutional transfer was also a process of culturally “returning home”. The
transformation experience of developed Asian countries/economics shows the similarity in the
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core values of Eastern and Western classical philosophies: human dignity, equality, social justice.
Therefore, Asian countries/economics with a strong Confucian tradition are still able to
successfully implement the institutional packages that were created based on a belief in the rule of
law and social justice.
The purposed institutional framework provide the suggestions for the future institutional
research. The integrated approach should be adopted and both general and specific characteristics
should be studied. Considering the influence of culture heritage the optimal institutional set could
be an individualized one rather a general one; considering the growth speed of open learning the
differences between the individualized optional package could be converged in long run.
Acknowledgments
Thanks for my students who helped me for the data sorting and processing
14
References
1. Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A., 2012. Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power,
Prosperity, and Poverty. Crown Publishers, New York.
2. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A., 2002. Reversal of Fortune: geography and
institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution. Q. J. Econ. 117, 1231–
1294.
3. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A., 2005. Institutions as the fundamental cause
of long-run growth, in: Aghion, P. Durlauf, S. (Eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth,
vol. 1. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 385-472.
4. Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., Robinson, J.A., 2014. Democracy does cause
growth. NBER Working Paper Series. doi: 10.3386/w20004.
5. Bortis, H., 1997. Institutions, Behaviour and Economic Theory. Cambridge
University, Press.
6. Clark, Liu., 2005.The Polished Mirror: Reflections on Natural Knowledge of the Way in
Zhuangzi and Alive Plantinga, Presented at the Tenth Anniversary Symposium inPhilosophy
and Religion, Peking University, October 19-21, 2005
7. Coase, W., Wang, N., 2012. How China Became Capitalist. Palgrave MacMillan,
London.
8. Durant, W.A., 1993. The Story of The Civilization., MJF Books
9. Fukuyama, F., 2012. The Origin of Political Order. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Henisz, W.J.,
2000. The institutional environment for economic growth. Econ. Polit. 12, 1–31.
10. Kornai, J., 2005. The great transformation of Central Eastern Europe: success and
disappointment, presidential address. Presented at I.E.A. 14th World Congress, Marrakech,
Morocco, 29 August, 2005.
11. North, D.C., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
12. Rawls, J., 1971. The Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Sen, A.,
1999. Development as Freedom. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. Varsakelis, N.C., 2006.
Education, political institutions and innovative activity: a cross-country empirical
investigation. Res. Policy 35, 1083–1090.
15
19
16
Appendix
Table -1 Full Development Countries
GDP WGI HDI Innovation Competition Growth
GR STD
Country Name Code Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rate
Luxembourg LUX 1 8 19 9 19 1.95 3.71
Norway NOR 2 4 1 16 32 1.26 1.72
Switzerland CHE 6 6 3 1 4 1.13 1.70
Australia AUS 7 12 2 27 7 1.89 1.14
Sweden SWE 8 3 14 6 36 1.89 2.70
Denmark DNK 9 5 4 8 18 0.83 2.16
Singapore SGP 10 11 11 18 2 3.12 4.76
United States USA 12 21 8 2 14 1.49 1.75
Canada CAN 13 9 9 26 6 1.54 1.79
Ireland IRL 14 19 6 17 5 3.41 4.36
Netherlands NLD 15 7 5 11 16 1.43 2.24
Austria AUT 16 10 23 19 35 1.44 1.84
Finland FIN 17 1 24 5 20 1.89 3.50
Iceland ISL 19 13 16 46 68 2.16 3.15
Belgium BEL 20 20 21 14 40 1.24 1.70
Germany DEU 21 15 6 4 23 1.36 2.33
France FRA 25 24 22 21 56 1.01 1.59
New Zealand NZL 26 2 10 15 3 1.52 1.68
United Kingdom GBR 27 16 14 10 8 1.56 1.95
Japan JPN 29 23 20 7 29 0.72 2.18
Hong Kong SAR,
China HKG 30 17 12 32 1 2.65 3.70
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Table -2 CEE Countries
GDP Rank WGI Rank HDI Rank
Innovation Competition
Growth rate GR STD
Rank Rank
ESTONIA EST 44 28 30 31 22 5.01 3.5
CZECH
43 33 28 28 30 2.22 3.51
REPUBLIC CZE
SLOVENIA SVN 35 34 25 75 92 2.33 3.37
POLAND POL 55 37 36 67 46 4.16 3.41
LITHUANIA LTU 49 38 37 38 58 5.81 0.96
SLOVAK
45 47 35 89 43 4.01 3.68
REPUBLIC SVK
LATVIA LVA 51 51 46 81 45 5.68 0.43
CROATIA HRV 58 57 47 124 51 2.71 7.62
HUNGARY HUN 57 46 44 127 46 2.34 1.38
Table -3 Fast Growth Countries
GR
RANK
Country Name Code
Growth
Rate
GR STD WGI Rank HDI Rank
Innovation
Rank
Competition Rank
1 Azerbaijan AZE 9.21 8.96 137 78 43
2 Myanmar MMR 8.83 3.19 164 148 137 117
3 China CHN 8.78 1.90 123 90 40 98
4 Georgia GEO 7.37 4.14 78 76 110
5 Armenia ARM 7.10 6.82 88 85
6 Belarus BLR 6.53 3.81 145 50
7 Macao MAC 6.31 9.10 56
8 Turkmenistan TKM 6.49 6.45 163 109
9 Iraq IRQ 5.48 17.18 165 121
10 Kazakhstan KAZ 5.76 3.99 135 69
11 Lithuania LTU 5.71 5.81 38 37 38 58
12 Cambodia KHM 5.67 2.97 139 143 101
13 Latvia LVA 5.56 6.28 51 46 81 45
14 Albania ALB 5.27 4.98 95 85 115 44
15 Mongolia MNG 5.42 4.26 82 90 104
16 Lao PDR LAO 5.28 1.20 143 141 71
17 Vietnam VNM 5.23 0.89 116 130 95
18 India IND 5.27 2.25 107 116 48 79
19 Trinidad and Tobago TTO 4.84 4.82 69 64 62
20 Estonia EST 4.92 6.49 28 30 31 22
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